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SENSITIVITY TRAINING: MULTIPLE CHEMICAL 
SENSITIVITY AND THE ADA 
Andrew K. KeUey* 
In these pools the children played, and rolled about in the mud of the 
streets; here and there one noticed them digging in it, after trophies 
which they had stumbled on. One wondered about this, as also about the 
swarms offlies which hung about the scene, literally blackening the air, 
and the strange,fetid odor which assailed one~ nostrils, a ghastly odor, 
of all the dead things of the universe . ... Was it not unhealthful? the 
stranger would ask; and the residents would answer, "Perhaps; but 
there is no telling.''! 
-Upton Sinclair, The Jungle 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For most employees in the United States today, work conditions 
have improved significantly from those of the Chicago stockyards at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Yet to a certain segment of 
the population, the odors commonly encountered in the workplace can 
be as noxious as those Upton Sinclair so vividly described in The 
JungZe.2 These people suffer from an affliction known as MUltiple 
Chemical Sensitivity (MCS). For sufferers of MCS, the smell of per-
fumes, cleaning solvents, and other common chemicals can create an 
atmosphere that leads to nasal congestion, headaches, fatigue, lack of 
concentration, and memory loss.3 Indeed, some sufferers of MCS react 
* Solicitations Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-
1998. 
1 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE, 36 (1985). 
2Id. 
3 See E.E. Sikorski & K.E. Rodgers, Overview in The Question of Multiple Chemical Sensi-
tivity, 24 FUNDAMENTAL & APPLIED ToXICOLOGY 22, 22 (1995). 
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so strongly to commonplace chemical odors that they simply cannot 
function when exposed to them.4 
Some MCS sufferers have pursued legal action to compel their 
employers to accommodate their condition.6 In these efforts, some 
have chosen to use the recently promulgated Americans With Dis-
abilities Act (ADA) as a source of legal recourse.6 As of this time, 
claims brought under the ADA by employees suffering from MCS 
have failed to get past defendants' summary judgment motions.7 
These claims have failed for two reasons.8 Courts have found either 
that these individuals were not disabled as defined by the ADA, or 
that even if they were disabled, the accommodations which they 
requested were unreasonable as a matter of law.9 
This Comment explores alternative ways in which workers who 
suffer from MCS can be viewed as disabled under the ADA, and the 
types of accommodations they can expect a court to find as reasonable. 
Section II of this Comment looks at MCS as a medical condition, 
briefly detailing the history, health effects, and debate which sur-
rounds it. Section III walks through the various elements of the ADA 
which are central to bringing a successful claim, and touches upon the 
factors which someone suffering from MCS must be able to prove. 
Section IV discusses the cases which have been brought by workers 
suffering from MCS under the ADA, and shows how the courts have 
treated these claims. Section V discusses how courts have treated 
ADA claims based on ailments similar to MCS, focusing on what these 
courts have considered to be reasonable accommodations. Section VI 
then sets out how an individual with MCS should present his or her 
claim, and what types of accommodations he or she can expect a court 
to endorse as reasonable. 
II. MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITY 
The medical diagnosis ofMCS traces its origin to an Illinois allergist 
named Theron Randolph.10 In 1962, Randolph developed a theory that 
4 See Jacob Berkson, Patient Statement: A Canary's 7hle, 10 ToXICOLOGY & INDUS. HEALTH 
323, 323 (1994). 
6 See Patrick v. Southern Co. Serv., 910 F. Supp. 566, 567 (N.D. Ala. 1996), aff'd, 103 F.3d 149 
(11th Cir. 1996); Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1556 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 
86 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 1996). 
6 See Patrick, 910 F. Supp. at 567; Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1556. 
7 See Patrick, 910 F. Supp. at 567; Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1556. 
B See Patrick, 910 F. Supp. at 567; Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1556. 
B See Patrick, 910 F. Supp. at 567; Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1556. 
10 See Sikorski & Rodgers, supra note 2, at 22; Thomas L. Kurt, Multiple Chemical Sensitivi-
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exposure to everyday chemicals can create a general allergic syn-
drome in some individuals.u It is this general allergic syndrome that 
we now know as MCS.l2 Randolph came to this conclusion after treat-
ing a patient who complained that she had become ill after passing 
through a highly industrialized area in which she was exposed to com-
bustion products and other by-products of gas, oil, and coal,13 The pa-
tient had a panoply of medical ailments, including rhinitis, asthma, 
headache, fatigue, irritability, depression, weight swings, and inter-
mittent loss of consciousness.l4 Not knowing what specific agent 
caused these problems, all that Randolph could advise was that she 
avoid exposure to as many everyday chemicals and foods as possible 
and see if her condition improved.l6 
The inheritors of Randolph's mantle are a group of physicians 
known as "clinical ecologists."l6 This group uses MCS as a diagnosis 
for patients with otherwise inexplicable illnesses characterized by 
multiple, subjective symptoms attributed to chemical exposure.l7 
Though a clear and precise definition of MCS has yet to emerge, it is 
commonly agreed among clinical ecologists that MCS is a "polysymp-
tomatic, multiorgan syndrome that is elicited in response to levels of 
chemicals and common foods and drugs that do not affect most peo-
ple."ls The symptoms that MCS sufferers commonly complain of are 
ties - A Syndrome of Pseudotoxicity Manifest as Exposure Perceived Symptoms, 33 CLINICAL 
ToXICOLOGY 101, 101 (1995). Though the modem debate over the legitimacy of MCS has 
centered around Randolph's hypothesis, some believe that the condition has existed since the 
end of the nineteenth century. In 1886 a French scientist named Glenard wrote about a condition 
which was then known as "neurasthenia." The most famous suffer of this condition was the 
French author Marcel Proust, who became so intolerant ofthe perfumes and other odors he was 
exposed to in ordinary life that he secluded himself in his Paris apartment and spent the latter 
years of his life in hermetic existence. James Bovard, A Name Still in Search of a Disease, THE 
SACRAlIIENTO BEE, Jan. 14, 1996. 
11 See Kurt, supra note 10, at 101; Claudia S. Miller, White Paper: Chemical Sensitivity: 
History and Phenomenology, 10 ToXICOLOGY & INDUS. HEALTH 253, 253 (1994) [hereinafter 
Miller, White Paper]. 
12 There are a litany of terms which are used to describe the condition commonly referred to 
as MCS. Some of these terms are: Chemical Sensitivity; Environmental Illness; Cerebral Al-
lergy; Twentieth Century Disease; Chemically-induced Immune Dysregulation; 'lbtal Allergy 
Syndrome; Ecologic Illness; Chemical Hypersensitivity Syndrome; Environmental Maladaption 
Syndrome; Universal Allergy; and Chemical AIDS. Miller, White Paper, supra note 11, at 257. 
13 See id. at 253. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See Sikorski & Rodgers, supra note 3, at 22. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
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nasal congestion, headaches, fatigue, lack of concentration, and mem-
ory 10ss.19 
Before an individual becomes afflicted with MeS a two-step process 
must occur.20 Initially the sufferer experiences a sensitizing stage, 
where he or she is exposed to a certain chemical.21 Either specific 
high-level exposure, or chronic low-level exposure may cause this 
sensitization.22 After the individual has been sensitized, he or she will 
then have adverse reactions to subsequent exposures to the same 
chemical, even at levels well below those tolerated by unafflicted 
individuals.23 Moreover, following sensitization to a particular chemi-
cal, a MeS sufferer can then begin to experience adverse reactions to 
low-level exposures to other, unrelated, chemicals.24 Thus, from an in-
itial exposure to a certain chemical an individual can become suscep-
tible to many chemicals, creating a debilitating condition that makes 
functioning in an uncontrolled environment exceptionally difficult.25 
The medical community has not universally accepted MeS as a 
legitimate physiological ailment.26 From its inception MeS has con-
tinually encountered considerable skepticismP Many of those in-
volved in the study and treatment of disease believe MeS is a psy-
chological problem which has been misdiagnosed.28 This skepticism is 
based on a number of factors. MeS has no generally accepted defini-
tion or diagnostic criteria.29 There is no clinical or laboratory marker 
for MeS, nor is there an identified mechanism for the condition.30 
There are no objective physical signs of MeS or laboratory indications 
of pathology, and there is a lack of response reproducibility.31 Because 
patients suffering from MeS report a wide diversity of symptoms, 
some skeptics contend that the condition cannot appropriately be 
called a syndrome, as a syndrome is defined as a group of symptoms 
19 See id. 
20 See Miller, White Paper, supra note 11, at 258. 
21 See Sikorski & Rodgers, supra note 3, at 22; Miller, White Paper, supra note 11, at 258. 
22 See Miller, White Paper, supra note 11, at 258. 
23 See Sikorski & Rodgers, supra note 3, at 22. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See J.e. Seiner, The Many Faces of Multiple Chemical Sensitivity in The Question of 
Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, 24 FUNDAMENTAL & APPLIED ToXICOLOGY 22, 25 (1995). 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See Sikorski & Rodgers, supra note 3, at 22. 
30 See Miller, White Paper, supra note 11, at 258. 
31 See Seiner, supra note 26, at 25. 
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or signs typical of a disease.32 The combination of these factors has led 
some in the medical profession to assert that "there is no such thing 
as multiple chemical sensitivity."33 
Putting aside the question of whether MCS is a psychological or 
physiological ailment, empirical data suggests that sensitivity 
to chemicals is of growing concern in today's society.34 One study 
shows that roughly one-third of the United States population reports 
symptoms of chemical sensitivity, characterized as considering oneself 
to be especially sensitive to certain odors.35 Although the number of 
people suffering from MCS is still relatively small, increasing num-
bers of people may turn to MCS to explain their physical ailments.36 
If MCS gains wider acceptance, conditions such as depression, mi-
graine headaches, asthma, and chronic fatigue syndrome may be 
linked to chemical exposures as well.37 Considering the widespread 
use of chemicals in the United States since World War II, and the fact 
that many Americans spend ninety percent or more of their days 
indoors with restricted ventilation, chemical sensitivity and the prob-
lems that attend it should be of ever increasing concern.38 
III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
In 1990 Congress enacted the Americans With Disabilities Act 
(ADA).39 The ADA has four main goals.40 The first goal is to enunciate 
strong and comprehensive guidelines to eliminate discrimination 
against disabled individuals.41 The second goal is to provide some clear 
and effective standards that address the problems caused by discrimi-
nation against the disabled.42 The third goal is to make sure that the 
federal government takes a central role in enforcing the standards set 
forth in the ADA.43 The last stated goal of the ADA is to use the full 
32 See Claudia S. Miller, Chemical Sensitivity: Symptom, Syndrome or Mechanism for Dis-
ease, 111 'IbXICOLOGY 69,71 (1996) [hereinafter Miller, Chemical Sensitivity]. 
33 See Selner, supra note 26, at 25. 
34 See Miller, Chemical Sensitivity, supra note 32, at 71. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 84. 
38 See id. at 83-84. 
39 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994). 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
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powers of congressional authority to address the daily discrimination 
faced by those with disabilities.44 
As the title of the ADA and its stated purposes indicate, Congress 
established it to give legal protection to a class of individuals, the 
disabled, who have been subject to past discrimination.45 In its at-
tempt to reach this goal, the ADA was created with three separate 
titles.46 These titles deal with the different substantive areas in which 
protection is to be provided: Title I deals with employment; Title II 
addresses discrimination in public services; and Title III targets pub-
lic accommodations and services operated by private entities.47 
A. Title I 
This Comment focuses on Title I of the ADA.48 Title I prohibits 
discrimination in the workplace against an otherwise qualified person 
with a disability.49 The basic principle that guides Title I is that, as 
long as an individual with a disability is able to perform the essential 
functions of a job, he or she should not be excluded from employment 
opportunities because of the disability.5O 
The general rule of Title I lays out the foundations for bringing a 
claim.51 To bring a claim under Title I of the ADA, an individual must 
show that he or she: 1) is qualified; 2) has a disability; 3) has been 
discriminated against because of the disability; 4) works for an em-
ployer covered by the ADA.52 The ADA is designed to eradicate 
discrimination in the following areas of employment: job application 
procedures; hiring; advancement; discharge; employee compensation; 
job training; and other terms, conditions and privileges of employ-
ment.53 
44 See id. 
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994). 
46 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
47 See id. 
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
49 See id. 
60 See id. TItle I is somewhat of an amalgam, borrowing much of its procedural framework 
from TItle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and much of its substantive framework from the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), at 31 (1990). 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
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Title I of the ADA explains what Congress intended to be consid-
ered discrimination by employers.64 The statute provides that dis-
crimination includes an employer's failure to make reasonable accom-
modations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability.55 However, the failure to make a 
reasonable accommodation will not be considered discrimination if the 
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of its business.56 
B. Definitions 
Navigating the labyrinth of Title I of the ADA requires defining a 
large number of specific terms. Congress designated the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as the agency responsi-
ble for the employment discrimination section of the ADA, and ac-
cordingly the EEOC has issued regulations and definitions under Title 
1.57 The terms that are central to an ADA claim under Title I are: 
covered entity; disability; otherwise qualified individual; reasonable 
accommodation; and undue hardship. 58 
1. Covered Entity 
A covered entity means an employer, employment agency, labor 
organization, or joint labor management committee.59 An employer is 
any person or agent of a person engaged in commerce who has fifteen 
or more employees for each work day in each of twenty or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.60 The term employer 
does not pertain to the United States, a corporation wholly owned by 
the government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or a bona fide 
private membership club (other than a labor organization) that is 
exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986.61 
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1994). 
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
66 See id. 
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(1) (1994). 
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
59 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(b) (1996). 
60 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)(1) (1996). The definition of employer changed for the period of time 
between July 26, 1992 and July 25, 1994, when it was necessary for an employer to have 25 or 
more employees for the same amount of calendar time. See id. 
6! See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)(2). Though not included in the scope of the ADA, the federal 
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2. Disability 
As the ADA is designed to protect the disabled, the term "disabil-
ity" is the linchpin upon which most claims are based.62 Disability is 
defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the "major life activities" of the impaired individual.63 
Additionally, there either must be a record of such impairment, or the 
disabled person must show he or she is regarded as being impaired 
by his or her employer.64 
A physical impairment is defined as a physiological disorder, condi-
tion, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more 
of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special 
sense organs; respiratory (including speech organs); cardiovascular; 
reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin 
and endocrine.66 A mental impairment is defined as a mental disorder 
such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or 
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.66 
When an individual suffers from a physical or mental impairment, 
that condition still must be substantially limiting for the condition to 
be covered by the ADA.67 To be limited substantially, an individual 
must either be unable, or be significantly restricted in his or her 
ability to, perform a particular major life activity.68 Examples of major 
life activities are: caring for oneself; performing manual tasks; walk-
ing; seeing; hearing; speaking; breathing; learning; and working.69 
This list, however, is not meant to be comprehensive.70 Rather, the list 
provides examples of the basic types of activities that the average 
person in the general population can perform with little or no dif-
ficulty.71 Indeed, the barometer for determining a major life activity 
government's employment practices are covered by the Rehabilitation Act, which provides the 
same basic framework for claims as the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994). 
62 See Patrick v. Southern Co. Serv., 910 F. Supp. 566, 567 (N.D. Ala. 1996), aJJ'd, 103 F.3d 149 
(11th Cir. 1996). 
63 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1996). 
64 See id. 
65 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1996). 
66 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). 
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). 
68 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l) (1996). 
69 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). 
70 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996). 
71 See id. 
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is whether an average person can perform the activity with little or 
no difficulty.72 
The EEOC provides several factors that courts can use to deter-
mine whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life 
activity.73 These factors include: the nature and severity of the impair-
ment; the duration (or expected duration) of the impairment; and the 
permanent or long term impact resulting from the impairment.74 
The EEOC provides a more specific definition of what it means to 
be substantially limited in the major life activity of working.76 To be 
substantially limited in the activity of working, an individual must be 
significantly restricted from performing either a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in various classes.76 The EEOC guidelines spe-
cifically state that being unable to perform a single, particular job in 
and of itself does not constitute a substantiallimitation.77 The EEOC 
also lists factors specific to the major life activity of working.78 These 
specific factors are: the geographical area to which the person has 
reasonable access; the number of similar jobs (those utilizing similar 
training, skill, knowledge or abilities) within the geographical area 
which the individual is also disqualified from because of the impair-
ment; and other dissimilar jobs in the geographical area which the 
individual is disqualified from due to the impairment.79 
3. Otherwise Qualified Individual 
Under the ADA an individual must have the requisite skill, expe-
rience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employ-
ment position to be considered a "qualified individual."SO In addition 
to these prerequisites, the individual also must be able to perform the 
"essential functions" of the position.81 For a disabled individual to be 
considered qualified, he or she must be able to perform the essential 
72 See id. 
73 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). 
74 See id. 
75 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (1996). 
76 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 
77 See id. 
78 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). 
79 See id. 
80 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996). 
81 See id. 
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functions of the job once his or her handicap has been "reasonably 
accommodated."82 
The essential functions of a position are defined as the fundamental 
job duties of the employment position.&'! In determining if a particular 
job function is essential, the following factors should be considered: 
whether the position exists because of the function; whether a limited 
number of employees exist among whom the function can be distrib-
uted; or whether the function is so highly specialized that the person 
was hired for it because of expertise in performing the function.84 
Evidence as to whether the job function is essential includes: the 
employer's judgment; written job descriptions made prior to inter-
viewing/hiring; the amount of time spent on the function; the conse-
quences of not requiring the person to perform the function; terms in 
collective bargaining agreements; work experience of past employees 
in the position; and the work experience of current employees in 
analogous positions.85 
4. Reasonable Accommodation 
Defining the term "reasonable accommodation" is essential not only 
because it factors into the determination of whether someone has 
been discriminated against, but also because it helps to determine if 
an individual is qualified for the position in the first place.86 The term 
reasonable accommodation means modifications or adjustments made 
by an employer that enable an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability to be considered for the position, perform the essential 
functions of the position, or enjoy the privileges and benefits that 
other similarly situated employees enjoy.87 Reasonable accommoda-
tions may include, but are not limited to: making existing facilities 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; job restruc-
turing; modification of work schedules; acquisition or modification of 
equipment; adjustment of examinations and training materials; and 
providing qualified readers or interpreters.88 Determining the appro-
priate reasonable accommodation involves an interactive process be-
82 See id. 
83 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1996). 
84 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). 
85 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). 
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996). 
87 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(1) (1996). 
88 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(2). 
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tween the employer and employee.89 Together the employer and em-
ployee must identify the precise limitations that the disability pre-
sents and suggest potential reasonable accommodations to overcome 
those limitations.90 
5. Undue Hardship 
Even if there is an accommodation that can be made for the indi-
vidual, the accommodation must not create an "undue hardship" for 
the employer.91 An undue hardship is defined as something which 
imposes significant difficulty or expense upon the employer when 
considered in light of five factors.92 The first factor includes the nature 
and net cost of the proposed accommodations.93 The second factor 
encompasses the overall financial resources of the employer, the num-
ber of employees at the employer's facilities, and the effects of the 
accommodation on expenses and resources.94 The third factor includes 
the overall size, financial resources, number, type and location of 
facilities of the covered entity.95 The fourth factor is the type of op-
eration which the covered entity runs.96 The last factor is the impact 
which the accommodation will have both upon the operation of the 
facility and the ability of the other employees to do their jobs.97 
IV. CASES BROUGHT UNDER THE ADA BY EMPLOYEES WITH MCS 
Few cases have been brought under the ADA by individuals suf-
fering from MCS.98 Those MCS sufferers who have brought claims 
have had very limited success.99 Due to the myriad of requisite ele-
ments under the ADA, MCS claims have failed for a variety of rea-
89 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(3). 
90 See id. 
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). 
92 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(l) (1996). 
93 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2). 
94 See id. 
96 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See Frank v. New York, 972 F. Supp. 130, 131 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Treadwell v. Dow-United 
Techs., 970 F. Supp. 974, 975 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Patrick v. Southern Co. Serv., 910 F. Supp. 566, 
567 (N.D. Ala. 1996), aff'd, 103 F.3d 149 (11th Cir. 1996); Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 926 
F. Supp. 1555, 1556 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 1996). 
99 See Frank, 972 F. Supp. at 131; Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 975; Patrick, 910 F. Supp. at 567; 
Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1556. 
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sons.loo As a result, no ADA claim by an MCS sufferer to date has 
survived a defendant's summary judgment motion.10l 
Any person bringing a claim under the ADA initially must show 
that he or she suffers from a disability.110 On an evidentiary level, this 
requirement has been difficult for MCS sufferers to prove, in part 
because of the skepticism which some courts have expressed toward 
the condition and its proponents.103 The United States District Courts 
of both the Northern District of New York and the Middle District of 
Alabama have granted defendants' motions in limine seeking to ex-
clude plaintiffs' expert testimony relating to MCS.1M These courts 
have held that "testimony regarding MCS, the treatment of MCS, and 
diagnoses and treatment modalities grounded in clinical ecology are 
lacking in scientific reliability and, therefore, must be ruled inadmis-
sible."l06 These courts have refused to allow expert testimony regard-
ing MCS because it lacks scientific reliability, thereby failing to meet 
the standards for expert opinion testimony established by the Su-
preme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. lOO 
These courts have pointed to the lack of general acceptance of MCS 
within the medical community and the absence of objective data as 
factors leading to their determination that MCS is not scientifically 
reliable.107 In these cases, the plaintiffs have been forced to eschew 
expert testimony regarding MCS, and instead have had to rely upon 
separate medical testimony that they are sensitive or allergic to par-
ticular agents, that these agents are present in the workplace, and 
that these agents are the cause of their adverse physical reactions. lOB 
In addition to evidentiary issues, plaintiffs with MCS have had 
further difficulty proving that their condition constitutes a disabil-
100 See Frank, 972 F. Supp. at 131; Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 975; Patrick, 910 F. Supp. at 567; 
Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1556. 
101 See Frank, 972 F. Supp. at 131; Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 975; Patrick, 910 F. Supp. at 567; 
Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1556. 
102 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
103 See Frank, 972 F. Supp. at 137; Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 983. 
104 See Frank, 972 F. Supp. at 137; Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 983. 
106 Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 984. 
106 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993). The Su-
preme Court in Daubert set out the following factors in assessing whether to admit scientific 
evidence by expert testimony: (1) whether the scientific theory can be and has been tested; (2) 
the extent to which the theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known 
or potential rate of error of any scientific technique at issue; and (4) whether the theory is 
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. [d. 
1M See Frank, 972 F. Supp. at 134; Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 982. 
103 See Treadwell, 970 F. Supp. at 984. 
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ity.109 For example, in Patrick v. Southern Co. Services, the United 
States District Court for the District of Alabama found that the 
plaintiff, who suffered from MCS, failed to establish that she was 
disabled within the ADA's definition of the term.110 The plaintiff in 
Patrick claimed that because she suffered from MCS she was unable 
to work in the office building where defendant had stationed her, and 
requested that the defendant accommodate her by transferring her 
to another building.111 In assessing her claim, the court did not discuss 
whether MCS is an accepted medical condition, but instead looked to 
the ADA for the definition of the term disability,u2 Under this analy-
sis, the court concentrated its attention on whether the plaintiff's 
suffering from MCS substantially limited her in the major life activity 
of working.113 
In determining whether the plaintiff was substantially limited in 
her ability to work, the Patrick court explicitly made clear that to be 
substantially limited the plaintiff must show more than an inability to 
perform her particular job,u4 Rather, the plaintiff must show that her 
impairment disqualifies her from a class of jobs or a broad range of 
jobs in various classes.115 If the plaintiff can establish her disqualifica-
tion from a class of jobs, the court noted, she shows that her impair-
ment truly hampers her ability to participate in an activity that the 
rest of society is able to perform.116 
Having established these guidelines for the determination of 
whether the plaintiff can be classified as disabled under the ADA, the 
court determined that the plaintiff failed to present substantial evi-
dence to show that MCS had disqualified her from a class of jobs or 
broad range of jobs.117 The court relied in part on the plaintiff's claim 
that she could have been accommodated by working in a different 
building for the same employer.l1s Because the plaintiff only alleged 
that MCS prevented her from working in a particular building, the 
109 See Patrick v. Southern Co. Serv., 910 F. Supp. 566, 567 (N.D. Ala. 1996), aff'd, 103 F.3d 149 
(nth Cir. 1996). 
110 See id. at 571. 
111 See id. at 570. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See Patrick, 910 F. Supp. at 569. 
116 See id. 
116 See id. at 570-71. 
117 See id. at 571. 
118 See id. at 570. 
498 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:485 
court concluded that she was not substantially limited in the major 
life activity of working.119 
In contrast to the rigid definition of disabled used in Patrick, other 
courts have been more willing to find that people suffering from MCS 
are disabled.l20 However, these courts have placed another hurdle in 
front of plaintiffs suffering from MCS by focusing on the ADA defini-
tions of qualified individual and reasonable accommodations.121 In 
Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the United States District Court 
for the District of Georgia found that the plaintiff suffering from MCS 
presented a triable issue as to whether she suffered from a disability 
as defined by the ADA.I22 Despite this concession, the plaintiff's ADA 
claim failed because the only accommodation she would accept the 
court judged to be unreasonable as a matter of law.l23 
In Whillock, the plaintiff had held a variety of positions with Delta 
Airlines over a twenty-five year period, the last being reservation 
sales agent.l24 While on the job as a sales agent the plaintiff experi-
enced an acute exposure to a disinfectant used by a co-worker on her 
workspace.l26 This exposure led the plaintiff to develop what was sub-
sequently diagnosed as MCS.126 After experiencing numerous difficul-
ties from her condition, both at work and in other daily activities, the 
plaintiff and her doctor concluded that the only accommodation that 
would allow her to continue to perform her job would be to work from 
her home.l27 In discussing the plaintiff's claim that she should be 
classified as disabled under the ADA, the court noted that her hy-
persensitivity to chemicals and chemical odors severely impaired her 
normal breathing.128 The court found that this impairment could be 
considered a substantial limitation on a major life activity.129 On the 
basis of this evaluation, the court found that there was suf-ficient 
evidence for a jury to find that the plaintiff had a disability.130 Thus, 
119 See Patrick, 910 F. Supp. at 571. 
120 See Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1563 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 86 F.3d 
1171 (11th Cir. 1996). 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 1565. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. at 1557. 
126 See Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1557. 
126 See id. at 1558. 
127 See id. at 1561. 
128 See id. at 1562. 
129 See id. 
130 See Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1563. 
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the court demonstrated that MCS can in fact constitute a disability 
as it is defined in the ADA.131 
After addressing the question of disability, the court proceeded to 
analyze whether the plaintiff met the other requirements necessary 
to bring an ADA claim.132 The court focused on the second require-
ment in Title I, that the plaintiff be otherwise qualified for the job.133 
To be considered qualified, the court noted that the plaintiff must 
show that she could perform the essential functions of her job with a 
reasonable accommodation.l34 The plaintiff in Whillock contended that 
she was unable to perform her job duties anywhere but in her home.13G 
Because of this, the court's analysis focused on whether her requested 
accommodation of working at home was reasonable as defined by the 
ADA.136 
In its analysis, the court noted that in order for the plaintiff to be 
qualified she must be able to perform the essential functions of the 
job.137 The court then stated that it is the employer who determines 
the essential functions of the job.138 The court found that the plaintiff's 
position was one in which the employer required in-person interac-
tion, both with customers and with other employees.139 Because regu-
lar attendance was an essential function of the plaintiff's job, and she 
was unable to attend work regularly, the plaintiff was unable to per-
form the essential functions of the job.140 Because the accommodation 
would eliminate an essential function of the job, the court reasoned 
that the plaintiff could not be defined as a "qualified" individual.141 
Once the plaintiff was deemed unqualified, she was no longer under 
the protective umbrella of the ADA.l42 
131 See id. at 1563. The court notes that the ADA mandates a case-by-case determination of 
whether a plaintiff's condition is so severe as to substantially limit a major life activity. See id. 
(citing Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723 (5th. Cir. 1995». Because of this principle, 
there can be no per se definition of MCS, or presumably any other impairment, as being 
something which would constitute an ADA defined disability. See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
136 See Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1563. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. at 1564. 
140 See Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1565. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
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The court in Whillock went further, though, and addressed whether 
the proposed accommodation could be considered "reasonable."l43 Al-
though the court recognized that there may be some forms of employ-
ment in which working at home was a reasonable accommodation, in 
this case, such an accommodation could be classified as unreasonable 
as a matter of law. 1M The court based this conclusion on the notion 
that the plaintiff's position required teamwork and supervision, 
two elements which could not exist if the employee was working at 
home.l45 Because of these considerations, the quality and productiv-
ity of the employee would necessarily drop if she worked at home, 
thereby making the accommodation unreasonable.l46 
V. SIMILAR CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER THE ADA AND 
REHABILITATION ACT 
Courts considering what constitutes a disability under the ADA 
have provided helpful guidance for employees suffering from MCS 
who are bringing claims.147 Instead of determining whether the plain-
tiff is impaired in the major life activity of working, some courts have 
focused on restricted breathing capabilities, finding that plaintiffs 
with such problems may be considered disabled under the ADA.l4B To 
date courts have been willing to accept that medical conditions which 
adversely affect breathing can be disabilities.149 In Homeyer v. Stan-
ley Tulchin Associates, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff's breathing difficulties, 
which were aggravated by cigarette smoke, qualified her as disabled 
under the ADA.l50 In Homeyer, the plaintiff was a typist who had 
worked in the defendant's office for two years.161 The plaintiff suffered 
from chronic severe allergic rhinitis and sinusitis which impaired her 
ability to breathe, and this difficulty was heightened by co-workers' 
143 See id. 
144 See id. at 1566. 
146 See Whitlock, 926 F. Supp. at 1566. 
146 See id. 
147 See Homeyer v. Stanley Thlchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996); Whillock, 926 
F. Supp. at 1562. 
148 See Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 962; Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1567. 
149 See Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 962; Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1562; Harmer v. Virginia Elec. & 
Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (E.n. Va. 1993); Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 
89 (W.n. Wa. 1982). 
160 See Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 962. 
161 See id. at 960. 
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tobacco smoke which she encountered in the office.152 When she in-
formed her employers of her disability and asked them to accommo-
date her she was told that no accommodation would be made, and that 
she should seek employment elsewhere.l53 
The defendant in Homeyer argued that the plaintiff was not dis-
abled as defined by the ADA because she could find similar employ-
ment in a smoke-free environment with another employer. 1M Because 
of the availability of other employment, the defendant reasoned, the 
plaintiff was not disqualified from a class or broad range of jobs, and 
therefore not substantially impaired in her ability to work.1OO Al-
though the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois agreed with the defendant and granted its motion to dismiss, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed, 
reversing the decision and remanding the case. l56 The Court of Ap-
peals agreed with the District Court that in an ADA claim where the 
disability is classified as an impairment to work the plaintiff must 
show that he or she is substantially limited in the general ability to 
work, and not that the individual cannot work at one particular job.157 
However, the Court of Appeals went on to say that granting the mo-
tion to dismiss was inappropriate because the plaintiff's breathing 
difficulties properly could be regarded as a disability under the 
ADA.l58 The Court of Appeals found that even if the plaintiff was able 
to find other comparable jobs in the area, a trier of fact could deter-
mine that the plaintiff's breathing difficulties qualified her as disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA.159 Because the plaintiff's condition 
could be considered a disability, the case was then remanded to de-
termine if the defendant had failed to provide a reasonable accommo-
dation.1OO 
Courts have provided some clues to the types of accommodations 
they would consider reasonable for an employee with a breathing 
disability.161 Courts have made it clear that no accommodations are 
152 See id. 
163 See id. 
154 See id. at 962. 
166 See Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 961. 
166 See id. at 963. 
157 See id. at 961. 
158 See id. at 962. 
159 See id. 
160 See Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 963. 
161 See Harmer v. Virginia Elec. & Power, 831 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (E.D. Va. 1993); Vickers v. 
Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 89 (W.D. Wa. 1982). 
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per se reasonable, or per se unreasonable, insisting that the determi-
nation can only be made on a case by case basis.l62 Yet some courts 
have deemed specific accommodations made by employers reasonable, 
thus indicating what future plaintiffs might have the right to expect 
under Title I of the ADA.I63 
Of the specific accommodations that have been judged reasonable, 
those made by employers for employees with breathing disabilities 
are potentially the most applicable to MCS sufferers.l64 These exam-
ples can be found in cases brought under both the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act.165 
In Vickers v. Veterans Administration, the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington found that the accom-
modations which the defendant had made for the plaintiff were rea-
sonable as defined by the Rehabilitation Act, and that they were not 
required by law to provide the specific accommodation the plaintiff 
sought.l66 In Vickers the plaintiff, who worked in the purchasing and 
contracts section at the Veterans Administration, was hypersensitive 
to cigarette smoke.167 To accommodate the plaintiff's hypersensitivity 
the defendant provided a number of accommodations.l63 These accom-
modations included: physically separating the desks of smokers and 
non-smokers; convincing the other workers in the plaintiff's room to 
agree to not smoke; encouraging workers in rooms adjacent to the 
plaintiff's to agree not to smoke; installing vents in rooms where 
smoking did take place; installing an air purifier in the office of one 
smoker; offering to create a partition around the plaintiff's desk; 
giving plaintiff a chance to move his desk next to a window; and 
offering plaintiff an outside maintenance job.169 Despite these accom-
modations, the plaintiff insisted that he was entitled to work in an 
environment wholly free of tobacco smoke.170 The court disagreed 
162 See Buckingham v. U.S., 998 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993); Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
163 See Van Zande v. Wisconsin Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995); Harmer, 831 
F. Supp. at 1306; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
164 See Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1306; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
166 See Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1306; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. The courts view the ADA 
as extending the regulations placed upon the federal government to private employers. Thus, 
courts have often looked to cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act in determining whether 
requirements such as that of reasonable accommodation have been met under the ADA. See 
Van Zande, 44 F.3d at 542. 
166 See Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
167 See id. at 87. 
168 See id. at 88. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 86. 
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with the plaintiff, finding that the defendant had reasonably accom-
modated the plaintiff's condition.171 The court noted that the defen-
dant was in a position where it had to balance the rights both of those 
who smoked and those who were affected adversely by cigarette 
smoke.172 Because no statute or state regulation forbade smoking in 
government offices, the defendant had to pursue a policy which would 
not infringe upon the rights of smokers.173 In light of this, the court 
found that the defendant's accommodations were reasonable, and that 
the measures taken served as an appropriate balance between the 
competing interests.174 
In Harmer v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that the 
defendant's accommodations of the plaintiff's bronchial asthma were 
reasonable as required by the ADA.175 The plaintiff had worked for 
the defendant for twelve years, the last six having served as a buyer 
in the defendant's purchasing department.176 The plaintiff's bronchial 
asthma severely restricted his breathing ability, his ability to care for 
himself, and his ability to walk.177 The plaintiff's doctor felt that the 
plaintiff's exposure to tobacco smoke at the workplace served as a 
major aggravant to his condition.178 As a result of his doctor's advice, 
the plaintiff and several other co-workers requested a ban on smoking 
on the floor that they worked on.179 The defendant refused to institute 
such a ban, and instead provided other accommodations to the plain-
tiff's condition. ISO These accommodations included: providing employ-
ees with fans; providing employees with smokeless ashtrays and air 
purifiers; rearranging the office to create more space between smok-
ers and non-smokers; prohibiting smoking in rest rooms, conference 
rooms and hallways; and restricting smoking to the smoker's cubi-
cle.181 
The court in Harmer found that the accommodations provided by 
the defendant met the reasonableness standard of the ADA because 
171 See Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
176 See Harmer v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300, 1307 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
176 See id. at 1302. 
177 See id. at 1303. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1303-04. 
181 See id. 
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they allowed the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of his 
job.l82 The court found that the evidence, which included performance 
evaluation reports made by the defendant, showed that the plaintiff 
had been able to meet his job requirements.l83 The court reasoned that 
since the plaintiff was able to successfully perform his job require-
ments, the accommodations which the defendant made must have 
been reasonable.l84 Further, because the accommodations were rea-
sonable the ADA did not require the defendant to provide the smok-
ing ban the plaintiff had asked for.l86 The court viewed the plaintiff's 
request for a smoking ban as an "absolute accommodation," rather 
than as a reasonable one, and found that the ADA does not mandate 
such a standard.l86 
VI. STRATEGIES FOR EMPLOYEES WITH MCS PURSUING ADA 
CLAIMS 
As the case law indicates, employees who suffer from MCS face two 
basic hurdles in claims brought under Title I of the ADA: (1) showing 
that they are disabled; and (2) showing that the accommodation they 
requested is reasonable.187 The disability prong may be satisfied based 
upon principles already espoused by the COurtS.I88 Similarly, the courts 
have provided a good sampling of accommodations which they have 
found to be both reasonable and unreasonable.l89 Drawing upon past 
decisions, it should become easier for employees suffering from MCS 
to prove they are disabled as defined by the ADA, making them 
eligible for a reasonable accommodation.lOO Further, past decisions 
should illuminate what a disabled employee with MCS can and cannot 
expect from an employer in terms of a judicially defined reasonable 
accommodation.191 
182 See id. at 1306. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
186 See Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1306. 
186 See id. 
187 See Patrick v. Southern Co. Serv., 910 F. Supp. 566, 570 (N.D. Ala. 1996), aff'd, 103 F.3d 149 
(11th Cir. 1996); Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 
86 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 1996). 
188 See Homeyer V. Stanley 'fulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996); Whillock, 926 
F. Supp. at 1562. 
189 See Van Zande v. Wisconsin Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995); Harmer, 831 
F. Supp. at 1303; Vickers V. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 88 (W.D. Wa. 1982). 
190 See Van Zande, 44 F.3d at 545; Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1303; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 88. 
191 See Van Zande, 44 F.3d at 545; Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1303; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 88. 
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Based upon the successes of employees disabled by the presence of 
cigarette smoke in the workplace, employees who suffer from MCS 
should present themselves as having a disability based upon their im-
paired ability to breathe, and not upon an impaired ability to work.l92 
When an individual claims a disability has impaired his or her ability 
to work, courts have made the plaintiff show that he or she is un-
able to perform a wide variety of jobs.l93 This has proven to be an 
exacting standard, and one which plaintiffs may have significant 
difficulty meeting.l94 
Courts have recognized that breathing disorders, which MCS could 
qualify as being, can constitute a disability as defined under the 
ADA.196 By focusing on an inability to breathe properly in the pres-
ence of odors found in the workplace, a plaintiff with MCS can claim 
that he or she is disabled in the same way that someone with a 
breathing disorder is when confronted with cigarette smoke.1OO By 
framing MCS properly as a condition which substantially limits the 
major life activity of breathing, a plaintiff with MCS can pass the 
critical initial barrier to an ADA claim.197 
Once an employee with MCS can be classified as disabled under the 
ADA, the question then becomes what types of accommodations the 
ADA will require the employer to provide.l98 Historically, courts have 
classified a requested accommodation of working at home as unrea-
sonable.l99 Courts have reasoned that such an accommodation, in the 
vast majority of jobs, greatly reduces the employees' productivity, 
making the accommodation unreasonable as a matter oflaw.2OO Accord-
192 See Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 961. If the plaintiff is unable to introduce testimony regarding 
MCS, he or she should instead focus on obtaining medical testimony regarding breathing 
difficulties and allergies to specific substances. See id. In this instance, the plaintiff would then 
have to show that these substances are present in the workplace, and exist at a level which 
would trigger his or her breathing difficulties. See Frank v. New York, 972 F. Supp. 130, 131 
(N.D.N.Y. 1997); Treadwell v. Dow-United Techs., 970 F. Supp. 974, 975 (M.D. Ala. 1997). 
193 See Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 961; Patrick v. Southern Co. Serv., 910 F. Supp. 566, 570-71 (N.D. 
Ala. 1996), aiI'd, 103 F.3d 149 (11th Cir. 1996). 
194 See id. 
195 See Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 961; Whitlock, 926 F. Supp. at 1562. 
196 See id. 
197 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1996). This step is critical because without it a plaintiff cannot 
place himself or herself in a position where an employer will be mandated by law to make a 
reasonable accommodation. See Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 961; Whitlock, 926 F. Supp. at 1562. 
198 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). 
199 See Van Zande V. Wisconsin Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995); Whitlock, 926 
F. Supp. at 1565. 
200 See Van Zande, 44 F.3d at 545; Whitlock, 926 F. Supp. at 1565. 
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ing to the majority view, "it would take a very extraordinary case for 
the employee to be able to create a triable issue of the employer's 
failure to allow the employee to work at home.''201 Considering this 
standard, most if not all employees with MCS would have great 
difficulty finding a court which would allow their request for an ac-
commodation of working at home to get past summary judgment.202 
There do seem to be some accommodations that courts deem as 
reasonable under the ADA which may help an employee suffering 
from MCS to function in the workplace.203 The accommodations that 
might be most helpful for those suffering from MCS are those made 
by employers for employees with impaired breathing abilities who 
had difficulty with cigarette smoke.204 These accommodations tend to 
focus on creating an environment where the offending odors are mini-
mized or isolated from the disabled employee's workspace.206 These 
accommodations have included: restructuring the seating arrange-
ments in an office; providing air purifiers; creating partitions; and 
getting co-employees to agree to minimize offending odors.206 In se-
vere cases of MCS, such modifications might not provide enough of a 
sanctuary for an afflicted individual to remain on the job. However, 
these types of modifications to the work environment may in some 
cases allow sufferers of MCS to be able to continue to work. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Those afflicted with MCS have a difficult time maintaining normal 
lives in today's society.207 For these people, the workplace can present 
a contaminated environment that precludes them from effectively 
performing their jobs.208 The ADA has the potential to serve as a 
source of legal recourse for those with MCS trying to find an environ-
ment in which they can work.209 By claiming that they are disabled 
because of the difficulty they have breathing, MCS sufferers can 
201 See Van Zande, 44 F.3d at 545. 
202 See Whitlock, 926 F. Supp. at 1565. 
203 See Harmer v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (E.D. Va. 1993); Vickers 
v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 89 (W.D. Wa. 1982). 
204 See Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1306; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
206 See Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1306; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
2Il6 See Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1306; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
207 See Miller, White Paper, 8Upra note 11, at 253. 
2Il6 See Miller, Chemical Sensitivity, supra note 32, at 71. 
209 See Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1306; Vwkers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
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qualify for ADA protection.210 Once an MCS sufferer is recognized as 
being disabled under the ADA, he or she is entitled to a reasonable 
accommodation of his or her disability.211 Though judicial determina-
tion of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation is highly fact-
specific, courts in the past have found accommodations such as air 
purifiers, restructuring seating arrangements, and creation of parti-
tions reasonable as a matter oflaw.212 These accommodations may help 
MCS sufferers, and may be within their legal right to receive. 
210 See Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1996). 
211 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). 
212 See Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1306; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89. 
